

## ROMAN MILITARY EXPEDITIONS IN THE SALLENTINE AREA (307 AND 302 B.C.)

Decebal Nedu\*

**Abstract:** For the year 307 BC, Livy mentions a war waged by the Roman troops in the Salentine area. Modern historians often took this episode with suspicion although there are no solid grounds for suspecting its reliability. In all likelihood, the Salentine campaign was carried out by an expeditionary troop detached from the Roman army that had been operating in Apulia. It was a warning for Tarentum and the Romans might have won allies in the Salentine region beginning with 307 BC. Following the end of the Second Samnite War, in 303 BC, Tarentum asked the Spartan commander Cleonymus for his help in the war with the Lucanian League. Cleonymus' intention to create a personal dominion in the South of Italy led to the conflict with Tarentum and his allies in the peninsula. Another Livy's controversial paragraph tells about the Roman military operations against the Spartan general in the Salentine area, in 302 BC. Again, there is not enough evidence to reject Livy's information. Rome could have interfered in order to protect its allies from the South of Tarentum which were under the threat of Cleonymus. Caught between Rome and the Spartan commander, the Dorian colony had to find a diplomatic solution to release the pressure from at least one of the adversaries. The year 302 BC is the most plausible date of the Lacinian treaty, which justified the Tarentine attack against the Roman fleet in 282 BC. This treaty guaranteed that Rome would not interfere in Magna Graecia and Tarentum, in his turn, made concessions, recognizing the external status of the allies that Rome had in Apulia and the Salentine region.

**Rezumat:** Pentru anul 307 a.Chr., Titus Livius menționează un război purtat de trupele romane în regiunea salentină. Acest episod a fost privit deseori cu suspiciune de savanți moderni, deși nu există argumente solide pentru etichetarea sa ca eveniment inventat. Campania salentină a fost efectuată, cel mai probabil, de un corp expediționar detașat din armata romană care opera în Apulia. Aceasta a fost un avertisment pentru Tarentum și este posibil ca romanii să fi câștigat aliați în zona salentinilor, începând cu anul 307 a.Chr. După încheierea celui De-al Doilea Război Samnitic, în 303 a.Chr., Tarentum a apelat la serviciile comandantului spartan Kleonymos, deoarece se afla în război cu Liga Lucaniană. Kleonymos a fost tentat să-și creeze un domeniu personal în sudul Italiei, aspirație care l-a adus în conflict cu Tarentum și aliații săi din peninsula. La nivelul anului 302 a.Chr. un alt paragraf controversat al lui Titus Livius relatează operațiuni militare romane împotriva generalului spartan, desfășurate în aria salentină. Din nou, nu există motive suficiente pentru a respinge mențiunea lui Titus Livius. Intervenția Romei poate fi explicată prin necesitatea de a-și proteja aliații de la sud de Tarentum, care erau amenințați de Kleonymos. Prinsă între Roma și comandantul spartan, colonia doriană a trebuit să găsească o soluție diplomatică pentru a elimina cel puțin presiunea unuia dintre adversari. Anul 302 a.Chr. este cea mai plauzibilă dată pentru încheierea tratatului lacinian, care a justificat atacul tarentin asupra flotei romane în 282 a.Chr. Acest acord garantează neamestecul romanilor în Magna Graecia iar Tarentum, la rândul său, a făcut concesii, recunoscând statutul extern al aliaților pe care Roma îi avea în Apulia și regiunea salentină.

**Key words:** Apulia, Cleonymus, Diodorus, Lacinian treaty, Livy, Rome, Tarentum, Salentini.

**Cuvinte cheie:** Apulia, Kleonymos, Diodor, tratatul lacinian, Titus Livius, Roma, Tarentum, Salentini.

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\* Universitatea „Dunărea de Jos” Galați, Facultatea de Istorie, Filosofie și Teologie, Str. Domnească, nr. 122, 800201, Galați.

The Tarentine War broke out in 282 BC following an attack launched by the Tarentine fleet on a Roman squadron sailing in the Ionian Sea. The naval incident in 282 BC was only the pretext to start the military operations. The causes of the war are much deeper and can not be confined only to the events preceding the conflict. They gathered up over half a century and are deeply rooted in the convulsions that had changed the political architecture of Italy beginning with the Second Samnite War.

The events that took place at Naples in 327-326 BC led to the outbreak of the Second Samnite War but, at the same time, created opportunities for new treaty systems of the uttermost importance for defining the power relations in Italy. The Samnite League sent troops to assist the Greek city facing the Roman threat<sup>1</sup> and Tarentum advised the city to resist, promising naval support<sup>2</sup>.

The Tarentine intervention at Naples and the fact that the Campanian city came under the protection of Rome in 326 BC are the main reasons for the strained relations in the remaining years until the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. The Italiote League had lost an important member, and Tarentum saw the loss of influence over the city as a dangerous hit<sup>3</sup>. From that moment, Rome and Tarentum mutually suspected and the political game of the alliances made in the Italic Peninsula shows that both powers tried to take all the possible security measures<sup>4</sup>. At the same time, the strained relations with Tarentum pushed the military and diplomatic actions of Rome towards the South of Italy.

Even since 326 BC, at the beginning of the Second Samnite War, Rome concluded treaties with the Lucanians and the Apulians<sup>5</sup>. Livy, while recording the two diplomatic acts, noted that the Lucanians and the Apulians set themselves under the protection of Rome and they promised to supply it with people and weapons for the war. Legally speaking, Livy's paragraph suggests an act of *venire in fidem populi Romani*, but such an option is difficult to be accepted for 326 BC, when the Lucanians and the Apulians were not facing any imminent or serious danger. Further on, the same text indicates that the negotiations concluded with a friendship treaty (*amicitia*) but, again, the recording is not above suspicions. At the beginning of the Second Samnite War, the effects of such treaty would have been minimum. In 326 BC,

<sup>1</sup> Livy 8.23.1-2; Dionysius 15.5.2-3.

<sup>2</sup> Dionysius 15.5.2-3; Livy 10.25.7-8; Mommsen 1987, 213; Hoffmann 1934, 22 *sqq.*; Willeumier 1939, 89-90; Frederiksen 1984, 208; Brauer 1986, 73-74; Lomas 1993, 46 *sqq.*; Oakley 1998, 680-682; Eckstein 2006, 153; Nedu 2008a, 23-28.

<sup>3</sup> The foundation of the Italiote League: Ciaceri 1927, 413, Purcell 1994, 386-387; the alliance of the Greeks in Italy had already existed in 393 BC, when Dionysius I sieged Rhegium (Ciaceri 1927, 413); *cf.* also Willeumier 1939, 64, Brauer 1986, 43-44; information regarding the history of the league and its structure: Ciaceri 1927, 436-437, Brauer 1986, 55, Lomas 1993, 46, Purcell 1994, 387, Eckstein 2006, 149 *sqq.*

<sup>4</sup> The roots of the conflict between Rome and Tarentum could be older, during the presence of Alexander the Molossian in Southern Italy. In 331 BC, the king extended his action field to Poseidonia. In this context, Rome and Alexander concluded a treaty (Livy 8.17.10-11; Justin 12.2.12), but unfortunately its stipulations did not preserve. The Tarentines could have received this diplomatic act with hostility since they had been in conflict with the king who wanted to act independently in the Italian area.

<sup>5</sup> Livy 8.25.2-3: *et alia nova nihil tum animo tale agitantibus accesserunt auxilia. Lucani atque Apuli, quibus gentibus nihil ad eam diem cum Romano populo fuerat, in fidem venerunt, arma virosque ad bellum pollicentes; foedere ergo in amicitiam accepti.*

Rome needed strong alliances, with precise stipulations, to fight against the Samnites or to face the threats in the South of the Italic Peninsula<sup>6</sup>.

The context of 327-326 BC led to another division of the Italic states, based on their specific interests. Because the crisis at Naples was solutioned in the favour of Rome, since 327-326 BC, Tarentum and the Samnite League started considering Rome the common target of their foreign policy<sup>7</sup>. Rome had to find an urgent diplomatic reply to this coalition. The Lucanian League did not have any reason to see the contacts between Samnium and Tarentum with good eyes, if we take into account their history of conflicts before the Great Samnite War. The Dorian colony proved to be, in many occasions, a strong adversary for the Lucanian League, willing to expand itself over the Greek cities in Magna Graecia<sup>8</sup>. Given the fact that Tarentum and Samnium shared common views on their foreign affairs starting with 327 BC, there are no doubts that Lucania disliked this situation and tried, in turn, to make an alliance too. Rome proved to be the ideal partner for a treaty meant to meet the new external needs in the conflicting context of the years 327-326 BC, due to its war with the Samnite League and its strained relations with Tarentum<sup>9</sup>.

The Samnite expansion towards the plains of Apulia pushed the local communities in the network of the Roman alliances. A second battlefield could be opened there and the permanent presence of the Roman troops would have weakened the Samnite forces. The alliances from Apulia also isolated the Samnite Federation from the Sabellic tribes in Central Italy and surrounded its territories from the east. In 326 BC, the intricate external context offered these communities the opportunity to be sustained against the Samnites, but it is possible that Rome had also brought into discussion the position of its new allies from Apulia towards Tarentum. Military speaking, the region offered important advantages, since it could be used as a departure base for a expedition towards the South in case the tensions with Tarentum burst out. Tactically speaking, the negotiations with the Lucanian League, concluded or about to be concluded during the negotiations with the Apulians, could have offered the solution for blocking a possible Tarentine military intervention in the conflict area from Central Italy. There still remained the possibility of a Samnite-Tarentine junction through the Apulian area, and the Romans could have prevented this dangerous perspective only through winning new allies in Apulia and setting some bases of operation in this region. Undoubtedly, in 326 BC, a major objective of the diplomatic contacts in the Apulian area was to create favourable conditions to settle a second battlefield against the Samnites. The anti-Tarentine side of the negotiations can not be ignored either. As long as the Romans could not find a way

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<sup>6</sup> For the use of these instruments in the foreign policy of Rome see Phillipson 1911a, 380 *sqq.*, Phillipson 1911b, 36-53.

<sup>7</sup> Mommsen 1987, 214; Hoffmann 1934, 46 *sqq.*; we do not certainly know if the two powers interested in fighting against Rome signed a formal alliance, but the new context in the peninsula brought the Tarentines and the Samnites in a close relationship.

<sup>8</sup> We mention only an episode from the near past: the Lucanians had been in open conflict with Tarentum and its allies during the first stage of Alexander the Molossian's expedition in Italy; starting with 331 BC, being allied with the Bruttians, they opposed the intention of the king to create a personal dominion in the South of the peninsula (Livy 8.24.4-14; Justin 12.2.1-12.2.14).

<sup>9</sup> Nedu 2008b, 154 *sqq.*

to relax the relations with Tarentum, we can presume that the alliances signed with partners from the South-East of the peninsula were meant to keep the opponent at a distance<sup>10</sup>.

Rome kept its interest for the regions in the South-East of Italy during the Second Samnite War. Livy mentions two campaigns in Apulia, in 323 BC and 322 BC, which preceded the disaster at Caudium<sup>11</sup>. After 321 BC, the same author mentions a first Apulian expedition in 320 BC, when the people from Arpi concluded a treaty with Rome<sup>12</sup>. Two years later, in 318 BC, the communities of Teanum and Canusium were convinced to make an alliance with Rome<sup>13</sup>.

Once the fight against the Samnites had been resumed, Apulia became the second theatre of operations within the Roman tactics. The operations against the Samnites started again in this area in 315 BC<sup>14</sup>. The following year brought an important success in the attempt to surround the Eastern flank of the Samnite League. Luceria, an important city near the Apennines, was conquered and the senate decided to settle there a Latin colony of 2,500 people<sup>15</sup>.

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For the year 307 BC, Livy describes the consul L. Volumnius Flamma waging a war against the Sallentini<sup>16</sup>, while, a year later, according to Diodorus of Sicily, the Roman troops would have fought against the Samnites at Silvium, in the territory belonging to the Peuceti<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> Nedu 2009, 64-67.

<sup>11</sup> The expedition in 323 BC: 8.36.3-6; the one in 322 BC: Livy 8.38.2-8.40.2. Other operations are described in *Ab urbe condita* after 321 BC, but the Caudine peace raises questions regarding the fights against the Samnites, on each battlefield, between 320-315 BC. More likely, the peace made between Rome and Samnium after the defeat at Caudium put an end to the conflict until 315 BC, but the Roman annalists revarnished reputation of Rome inventing numerous compensatory victories (for the analysis of the Caudine peace see Salmon 1929, 12-18, Salmon 1967, 226 *sqq.*, Oakley 2005a, 3 *sqq.*, Forsythe 2005, 298 *sqq.*). The treaty in 321 BC forced the Romans to evacuate the colonies at Cales and Fregellae but did not restrict the possibilities of action in Apulia or other regions that were not part of the Samnite territory. Both powers perceived this act as a compromise peace that should have lasted until the recovery of their forces. In these conditions, Rome kept on looking for allies and tried not to lose the ones it already had under its influence. The battles with the Samnites, in Apulia, between 320-316 BC, can be omitted from the history of the Second Samnite War. But the fact that the Romans reinforced their presence there, using diplomacy or military means, is a reality that can hardly be denied.

<sup>12</sup> Livy 9.13.6-10.

<sup>13</sup> Livy 9.20.4-5; *cf.* Diodorus 19.10.2; the treaty from 317 BC, with the Teate, mentioned by the historian from Patavium (Livy 9.20.9), doubles the alliance signed with Teanum in 318 BC; the Teate are, in fact, the inhabitants of Teanum (*cf.* Oakley 2005a, 266-269). Salmon 1967, 230 *sqq.* considered the Apulian campaigns in 320-316 BC as fake events. *Pax Caudina*, quite likely, did not forbid the search for new allies and the communities in Apulia did not always willingly agreed to the Roman policy. Military pressure was necessary sometimes in order to bring them in the alliances network of Rome. Therefore, the presence of the Roman troops in Apulia during 320-316 BC is above suspicion (Nedu 2009, 67-68).

<sup>14</sup> Livy 9.23.1-2.

<sup>15</sup> Livy 9.26.1-5; Diodorus 19.72.8; *cf.* Salmon 1970, 58.

<sup>16</sup> Livy 9.42.4-5: *Creatus consul, cum collegae novum bellum, Sallentini hostes decernerentur, Romae mansit ut urbanis artibus opes augeter quando belli decus penes alios esset. Volumnium provinciae haud paenituit. Multa secunda proelia fecit, aliquot urbes hostium vi cepit.*

The Sallentine campaign in 307 BC requires a thorough analysis due to the connections that could be made with other events that took place shortly after in the South-East of Italy.

In the reconstructions of the Second Samnite War suggested by G. de Sanctis, J. Beloch and E. Salmon, the advance of the legions towards the Southern end of the peninsula, in the South of Tarentum, was considered implausible<sup>18</sup>. According to J. Beloch, there was no obvious reason that could explain the advance of a Roman army so far towards the South in 307 BC<sup>19</sup>. G. de Sanctis and E. Salmon also hesitated in accepting the Sallentine expedition and limited the geographical area of the operations in 307-306 BC, concentrating the fights around Silvium<sup>20</sup>. J. Beloch's opinion results from his perception of the Central Italic borders of the Roman foreign policy at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. From our point of view, this is not the best way of approaching the foreign affairs of Rome in the era of the Great Samnite War and the conclusions of J. Beloch are not plausible. The second way of approaching the Southern military activities in 307-306 BC belongs to G. de Sanctis and E. Salmon, who marginalize or even ignore the information about the expedition against the Sallentini preserved in Livy's text.

Certainly, the testimony of Livy can not be trusted completely and the annalistic touch of his work is meant to raise doubts even more. The methodological doubt led or could lead to some objections meant to question the authenticity of the event from 307 BC: 1. placing the expedition from 307 BC in the Sallentine area can be a geographical error<sup>21</sup>; 2. the destination of the expedition had been willingly faked; 3. the Roman annalists or Livy mixed the events during the consulship of L. Volumnius Flamma in 307 BC with the events that took place during the mandates of other magistrates in the Sallentine area; 4. the expedition dated by Livy in 307 BC could have taken place, more likely, during the second consulship of L. Volumnius Flamma, in 296 BC<sup>22</sup>.

The easiest way of considering the Sallentine campaign among the implausible events during the Second Samnite War would be to explain it making use of a geographical error that occurred in the Roman annalistic tradition or at Livy as a result of information misinterpretation. Certainly, no one can pretend that mistakes do not appear in Livy's texts but, in this case, to apply such a rectification involves major risks and benefits of few convincing arguments. This should not be done as long as we cannot reconstruct the way the geographical data have been misinterpreted or transmitted. Without a credible reconstruction, it would be better to avoid such reconstruction that can not be built on solid grounds.

<sup>17</sup> Diodorus 20.80.1-2: *In Italy, the Samnites took Sora and Calatia, cities that were allied to the Romans, and enslaved the inhabitants; and the consuls with strong armies invaded Iapygia and camped near Silvium. This city was garrisoned by the Samnites, and the Romans began a siege which lasted a considerable number of days. Capturing the city by storm, they took prisoner more than five thousand persons and collected a considerable amount of booty besides*; about Silvium: Strabo 6.3.8; cf. Nissen 1902, 861.

<sup>18</sup> St. Oakley, the commentator of the second pentade in *Ab urbe condita*, hesitated: the Sallentine expedition is suspicious (Oakley 1998, 681; Oakley 2005a, 551).

<sup>19</sup> Beloch 1926, 417.

<sup>20</sup> De Sanctis 1907, 335-338; Salmon 1967, 247-248.

<sup>21</sup> Although not stated clearly, the possibility of misunderstanding the geographical data is not excluded from E. Salmon's way of viewing the military activity of L. Volumnius Flamma in 307 BC (Salmon 1967, 247-248).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Beloch 1926, 436, Münzer 1992, 880.



*Central and Southern Italy during the second half of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC.*

The historian specialized in the Samnite Wars could also think of the possibility that some details of the military operations in 307 BC had been faked intentionally. The invention of false destinations or results was proved in the case of some campaigns described by Livy. A significant case in this category is worth mentioning below. The Samnite town of Bovianum, was conquered in 305 BC and this military success played an important part in putting an end

to the war a year later after the event<sup>23</sup>. Livy also mentions three expeditions against Bovianum that took place in 314 BC, 311 BC and 298 BC, but the chances for these to be historical realities are reduced<sup>24</sup>. The choice of the geographical data and the targets of the military expeditions were not accidental. The first historians of Rome preferred well-known places where important events in the military history of the Republic had taken place. Bovianum met perfectly these selection criteria: its surrender in 305 BC forced the Samnites to ask for peace and on account of this event Bovianum acquired a special reputation.

The same scenario cannot be used to explain the Sallentine campaign in 307 BC. In this case, the literary tradition does not give the necessary information to detect the contamination with other actions in the same area. Another two expeditions that took place in the Sallentine region before the First Punic War, in 302 BC and 267 BC, can not offer useful data in order to reconstruct a multiplication of the events. The populations in the Sallentine Peninsula did not play an important part in the history of the wars that led to the domination of Rome over Italy. The campaign in 302 BC is presented by Livy as a reaction to the aggressive actions of Cleonymus in this region<sup>25</sup> and the expedition in 267 BC did not meet a serious resistance<sup>26</sup>. Neither of these actions was decisive for the fate of a war as it was the case with the fall of Bovianum, in 305 BC. In these conditions, it is difficult to imagine the reason for which the Roman historians would have invented an expedition against a relatively unknown population that had never contested the Roman military superiority. Taking these facts into account, *the Bovianum scenario* can not be applied to the Sallentine War in 307 BC. Its narration, preserved by Livy, did not seem invented for the image of L. Volumnius Flamma or for the military glory of Rome.

The third argument, regarding a possible contamination of L. Volumnius Flamma's consulship with military episodes from other magistrates' careers, needs just a short comment. In 302 BC, the Roman legions which operated in the Sallentine area had been commanded by the consul M. Aemilius Paullus or the dictator C. Iunius Brutus Bubulcus. Both are mentioned in Livy's version of events as possible commanders of the army that moved forward to the Sallentine region to fight Cleonymus<sup>27</sup>. The military operations in 267 BC, which led to the occupation of Brundisium, were commanded by the consuls M. Atilius Regulus and L. Iulius

<sup>23</sup> Livy 9.44.14 (consuls L. Postumius Megellus, T. Minucius Augurinus, M. Fulvius Curvus – elected after the death of the last and credited with the celebration of a victory against the Samnites; see *Fasti triumphales* 305 BC); cf. Broughton 1951, 166-167, Salmon 1967, 250-251.

<sup>24</sup> 314 BC: Livy 9.28.1-2 (consuls M. Poetelius Libo, C. Sulpicius Longus); 311 BC: Livy 9.31.4-16 (consuls C. Iunius Brutus, Q. Aemilius Barbula); 298 BC: Livy 10.12.9 (consuls L. Cornelius Scipio, Cn. Fulvius Maximus); cf. Broughton 1951, 157, 161, 174; commentaries on these campaigns: Salmon 1967, 227-238, 244, 250-251, 261, Oakley 2005a, 329-330, 406, Oakley 2005b, 172. There are similitudes between the names of two consuls who commanded in Samnium on Bovianum direction: in 305 BC, M. Fulvius Curvus captured the town and in 298 BC, according to Livy, Bovianum was occupied again by the legions commanded by Cn. Fulvius Maximus. In this case, there can be presumed that the multiplying of actions resulted from a confusion between the activities of the persons involved. The conscious assignment of a fake military action has another reason. The annalists tried, in such cases, to insert glorious victories during the mandate of a magistrate, for the glory of the Roman people or of the one who was in charge of the troops.

<sup>25</sup> Livy 10.2.2-3.

<sup>26</sup> Livy *per.* 15; Florus 1.15; Eutropius 2.17; Zonaras 8.7.

<sup>27</sup> Livy 10.2.2-3; *Fasti consulares* 302 BC; Broughton 1951, 169.

Libo<sup>28</sup>. The expedition in 307 BC was attested as taking place under the command of the consul L. Volumnius Flamma and there is no similitude between him and the names of other magistrates who also activated in the Sallentine region. The different names of the five commanders, L. Volumnius Flamma, M. Aemilius Paulus, C. Iunius Bubulcus, M. Atilius Regulus and L. Iulius Libo, exclude the confusion between them and the interpolations between events that took place in different years.

The fourth argument against the historicity of the Sallentine campaign is based, as noted before, on the possibility that some actions taken by L. Volumnius Flamma in the South, during his second consulship in 296 BC, had been wrongly inserted among his actions in 307 BC, during his first consulship. The narration about the military campaigns in 296 BC does not encourage this kind of reconstruction. Under the pressure of the Samnites and the threats of the enemies from Etruria, the senate decided in 296 BC to continue using the military experience of the consuls from 297 BC, Q. Fabius Rullianus and P. Decius Mus, maintaining them in charge as proconsuls. The distribution of the provinces between the four commanders, according to Livy, was made as follows<sup>29</sup>: the proconsul Q. Fabius Rullianus was given the command in Samnium, probably extended to Lucania too, in case of necessity; P. Decius Mus acted also in Samnium where the two commanders conquered Murgantia, Romulea and Ferentinum; about the area under the command of the consul Volumnius Flamma, Livy did not find trustful information, but some sources presented him acting in a first stage in Samnium and then moving forward to Etruria; in this region, where the great coalition from Sentinum was in preparations, the command of the Roman legions was given to the second consul, App. Claudius Caecus<sup>30</sup>.

Summarizing the data about the military operations in which L. Volumnius Flamma was involved at the beginning of the 3rd century BC, it seems that he did not have any command in the South of Italy. Returning to the possibility of considering the Sallentine expedition in 307 BC an invented event, there can be seen that there are no “Southern” elements in L. Volumnius Flamma’s actions in 296 BC that could be accounted to his first consulship.

Taking into account the lack of consistency of the reasons that can be put forward to deny the Sallentine campaign at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, it is better to return to the texts

<sup>28</sup> Livy *per.* 15; Florus 1.15; Eutropius 2.17; Zonaras 8.7; *Fasti consulares* 267 BC; *Fasti triumphales* 267 BC; Broughton 1951, 200.

<sup>29</sup> The magistrates of the year 297 BC: Broughton 1951, 176-177.

<sup>30</sup> Livy 10.17.1-10.18.8. It is very difficult to assemble the information in a credible reconstruction, due to the confusing details about the actions of the four commanders, preserved by Livy, and to the variations he found in his sources. In spite of this situation, a hypothetical description of the Roman strategy applied in 296 BC is possible. P. Decius Mus commanded in 297 BC in Apulia (Livy 10.15.1-2) and probably his proconsular authority had prolonged his presence in this region. The operations in Samnium, concentrated in the Liris Valley, had been entrusted to Q. Fabius Rullianus, while the troops in Etruria were under the command of App. Claudius Caecus. The only thing left to be done was to take measures against a surprise attack of the Samnites against Latium. This defensive role was given to L. Volumnius Flamma, whose province covered the North of Campania (Salmon 1967, 262-263; Oakley 2005b, 201-203). The Roman strategy in the Liris-Campania area proved to be inspired and useful. While the Roman legions were fighting against the allied armies of the Italic adversaries at Sentinum, in 295 BC, L. Volumnius Flamma, who had the command as proconsul, succeeded in fighting back the Samnite attack on the *ager Stellas*.

that present the Roman actions in the South-East of the Italic Peninsula, in 307-306 BC. A credible picture based on them can be reconstructed if we leave aside the excessive criticism<sup>31</sup>.

The areas of the Southern operations can be traced corroborating the Livian paragraph 9.42.4 with the narration of Diodorus 20.80.1-2 about the battles at Silvium in 306 BC. The first author mentions the Sallentine campaign during the year 307 BC, while the second records the fights between the Romans and the Samnites at Silvium in 306 BC. Based on the two accounts, there can be concluded that there are two distinct military campaigns that can not be mistaken because of the chronological and geographical differences.

At Diodorus, the army that fought at Silvium is registered under the command of the consuls in 306 BC, Q. Marcius Tremulus and P. Cornelius Arvina. According to the historian from Sicily, they invaded Iapygia and camped near Silvium, where there was a Samnite garrison<sup>32</sup>. After capturing Silvium, they fought against the Hernici<sup>33</sup>. Apparently, examining only the short narration of Diodorus, there is no relation between the Apulian operations in 307 BC and the strategical moves in 306 BC. At Livy, the description of the battlefields in 306 BC shows a different situation. Q. Marcius Tremulus was given the duty to invade the territory of the rebellious Hernici and P. Cornelius Arvina fought against the Samnites that had occupied Calatia and Sora<sup>34</sup>. Livy's version about the military operations in 306 BC seems plausible if we take into account the new war against the Hernici and the fact that the Samnite troops could join the rebels through the two occupied towns. Both consuls fought in Central Italy without marching with their legions towards Apulia. In this area, the command of the operations at Silvium was probably ensured by extending the command of L. Volumnius Flamma, who was in charge of the operation as proconsul<sup>35</sup>. Therefore, we can conclude that in 307 BC the Roman army in Apulia did not obtain the expected results and was forced to remain on positions during the winter of 307-306 BC<sup>36</sup>.

The other campaign in 307 BC, which was not recorded in *The Library of History* but is mentioned in *Ab urbe condita*, headed to the extreme South of the Italic Peninsula and was directed, according to Livy, against the Sallentini. This author mentions that L. Volumnius Flamma received the command of the new war with the Sallentini, but he recorded just a few details about the campaign. Livy's narration about the expedition in the Sallentine area is very short: *Volumnius had no cause to regret his assignment. He engaged in many successful battles and took several hostile towns by assault*<sup>37</sup>. The lack of precision in his record show that he could not find anything more clear about this conflict in his sources. The logical formula in

<sup>31</sup> Mommsen 1987, 220: the Romans sent an army to explore the Sallentine region; Hoffmann 1934, 52, n. 111: the conflict with Tarentum led to L. Volumnius Flamma's campaign in the Sallentine area; Càssola 1968, 128 *sqq.* perceived the expedition as a proof of the Roman expansion towards the South, direction promoted by a political group that included App. Claudius Caecus too.

<sup>32</sup> Diodorus 20.80.1-2.

<sup>33</sup> Diodorus 20.80.4.

<sup>34</sup> The activity of Q. Marcius Tremulus: Livy 9.43.1-2, 9.43.6-7; the command of P. Cornelius Arvina in Samnium: Livy 9.43.1-4.

<sup>35</sup> The hypothesis, exposed by Salmon 1967, 248, seems well-founded; De Sanctis 1907, 336-338 reconstructed the fights in 306 BC based on paragraph of Diodorus: the consuls Q. Marcius Tremulus and P. Cornelius Arvina, after setting Samnium on fire, moved forward to Apulia where they captured Silvium; *cf.* Oakley 2005a, 535-538.

<sup>36</sup> Salmon 1967, 248.

<sup>37</sup> Livy 9.42.5.

which he placed L. Volumnius Flamma's consulship and the campaign against a new population shows that Livy considered this event the focus of the military operations in the South-East of Italy, in the year 307 BC. On the other hand, Diodorus locates the operations in 306 BC around Silvium, which was under the Samnite control. This narration, as already shown, would allow the correction of the short depiction made by Livy, establishing the center of the operations in 307-306 BC in the Apulian region where the Peuceti lived. Seen from the perspective of the strategy applied during this interval, the Sallentine expedition seems to represent a secondary extension of the Apulian battlefiled.

In the literary tradition there is no mention of the reasons for organizing the expedition and any reconstruction can not pretend to be more than a hypothesis. The Sallentine area, at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, seems to be a political mosaic made of small communities independently governed<sup>38</sup>. Three ethnical groups, the Messapi, the Calabri and the Sallentini can be found in this region during the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC<sup>39</sup>. The last group, the Sallentini, probably more powerful and numerous than the others, gave its name to the whole peninsula and it was often used to name the populations living in the South of Tarentum<sup>40</sup>. Based on the existing records, it is impossible to specify if the people in this region succeeded in making larger units. The political division makes less plausible a military confrontation between the legions of Rome and all the communities in this area. More likely, some communities, which can be generally named *Sallentine*, asked for the support of the Roman army in Apulia to solve a conflict or a litigation they had at that moment with other political structures in the area in the South of Tarentum.

The expedition, carried out by a detached troop from the Roman army that was fighting in Apulia, did not have any impact on the Second Samnite War. Nethertheless, it influenced the relations of Rome with the South of the peninsula in many ways.

The senate of Rome accepted to send troops to the South of Italy probably taking into account the strained relations with Tarentum. Presumably, the ones who were in charge with the Roman foreign policy interpreted correctly the geopolitical situation of the peninsula at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. The Samnite War had already entered its last phase and in 307 BC it seemed to end in the favour of Rome. In the neighbourhood of the Greek cities in the South, the Lucanian League, an ally of Rome, had been watching over the area since 326 BC and only waited for a favourable moment to restart its traditional conflict with Tarentum. In case the Samnite League had concluded peace, the perspectives of the Dorian colony would have been gloomy, under the threat of a possible conflict with Rome and without the possibility of finding alliances against it. If the Roman senate had this perception of the political and military context in Italy, then it is obvious why the Romans assumed the intervention in the Sallentine Peninsula. Tarentum could not react because the risk of an open conflict with Rome was very dangerous in case the Samnites had left the war and the chances of victory were too small. Rome foresaw the Tarentines' lack of reaction and their fear of isolation and also approached the Sallentine campaign in a different way. It was a warning and a boast of its power, meant to intimidate the political leaders of Tarentum.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Salmon 1982, 20.

<sup>39</sup> Salmon 1982, 19; Philipp 1991, 1907-1908.

<sup>40</sup> Nissen 1883, 540; Salmon 1982, 20.

Unfortunately, its results *in the field* cannot be measured with the kind of precision we would have wanted. The only references are those made by Livy who vaguely mentions L. Volumnius Flamma's involvement in many successful battles and the capture of some enemy cities. Nevertheless, from that moment on, those communities that required the intervention in 307 BC can be counted among the allies of Rome. This is an important outcome of the expedition. Since 307 BC, Rome had allies that should be protected in the neighbourhood of Tarentum; and the reason for defending an ally in danger was the easiest way to open the road for a military intervention.

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The peace of Bovianum, concluded with the Samnite League in 304 BC, was the juridical expression of a new balance of power in the Southern half of Italy. Its stipulations are recorded in a vague way by Livy, who mentions only the renewal of the old Roman-Samnite alliance<sup>41</sup>. Livy's inaccuracy does not allow the precise reconstruction of the content of the treaty in 304 BC, but, most likely, the Samnites recognized the territorial annexation where Rome had settled a series of colonies from 334 BC. Moreover, there can be presumed that Rome got the recognition of its allies in the Apulian region or in the South of Italy and inserted stipulations in the treaty that forbade the any Samnite aggression against them.

For the Tarentines, it was obvious that they could not rely on the services of the Samnite League against Rome. Its political and military isolation, anticipated since 307 BC, as shown above, increased even more the fear of a possible conflict with Rome and its Southern ally, the Lucanian Federation.

The measures to deal with the situations were found rapidly, possibly even since the Romans and the Samnites were negotiating. Due to the foreign affairs crisis at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC, in 303 BC, a commander from Greece, the Spartan Cleonymus, took the way to Italy, engaging to defend Tarentum against the aggressions of the Italic populations<sup>42</sup>.

In the literary tradition there are two accounts about his campaign in Italy. One is recorded by Diodorus of Sicily and the other one is preserved by Livy<sup>43</sup>. Both sources are questionable and some aspects linked with the Spartan general's presence in Italy are still hypothetical.

Diodorus dates his arrival in Italy during the consulship of S. Cornelius Lentulus and L. Genucius Aventinensis, a chronological reference that can be synchronized, according to

<sup>41</sup> Livy 9.45.4.

<sup>42</sup> The solution adopted was inspired by the experience of the past battles with the neighbouring Italic populations. Archidamus was called from Greece to fight against them between 344-343 BC (Diodorus 16.61.4-16.63.1; Plutarch, *Agis* 3.2; Mommsen 1987, 212; Ciaceri 1932, 6-7; Wuilleumier 1939, 79-82; Giannelli 1969, 1-6; Brauer 1986, 62-63; Lomas 1993, 42; Purcell 1994, 391; Musti 2004, 479); later, from 334 BC to 330 BC, Alexander the Molossian was also present in Southern Italy (Livy 8.3.6-7, 8.24.4-8.24.14; Justin 12.2.1-12.2.14; De Sanctis 1907, 277-278; Ciaceri 1932, 8-14; Hoffmann 1934, 17-21; Wuilleumier 1939, 82-89; Piganiol 1967, 159; Giannelli 1969, 6-22; Derow 1970, 38-39; Brauer 1986, 68-71; Lomas 1993, 42-43; Oakley 1998, 589-591, 664-674; Green 1990, 228; Purcell 1994, 391-392; Musti 2004, 479-481).

<sup>43</sup> Diodorus 20.104.1-4, 20.105.1-3; Livy 10.2.1-3.

Livy's chronology, with the year 303 B.C.<sup>44</sup>. Further on, the historian from Sicily mentions all the Spartan's actions in one episode, suggesting that his intervention in the Italic area took place only in 303 BC. Leaving behind the suspicious density of events concentrated by Diodorus in only one year, we have to observe that the description of Livy indicates two phases in Cleonymus' activity in Italy, the first one in 303 BC and the second one in 302 BC. The attacks against the Sallentini are recorded, in his testimony, in the year 302 BC, when the pair M. Livy Denther and M. Aemilius Paullus hold the consulship<sup>45</sup>. In order to complete the chronology of Cleonymus' adventure in the peninsula, the best approach would be to take into account both the sources, Diodorus and Livy. They suggest that the expedition in Italy took two years, 303 BC and 302 BC<sup>46</sup>. The arrival of the Spartan commander took place, according to Diodorus' narration, in 303 BC, and his presence in Italy ended one year later, in 302 BC, after a few military actions in the peninsula<sup>47</sup>.

In his account about the reasons for Cleonymus' landing in Italy, the Sicilian historian mentions that Tarentum was at war with the Lucanians and the Romans<sup>48</sup>. The information was sometimes partially denied, with the tendency of not taking into account Diodorus' reference to the Romans. If the strained Roman-Tarentine relations in the last decades of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC were only an anticipation of the later conflict, we would be tempted to believe that again we deal with a fake event. An important argument shows that the evidence of Diodorus should be taken somewhat into account. It seems to come from a Greek source and this excludes the possibility of anti-Tarentine and pro-Roman distortion, as it would have been the case of an annalistic reporting<sup>49</sup>.

Following the peace at Bovianum, Rome could afford to interfere in the affairs of Southern Italy. But a series of political and military events show the main directions in the foreign policy of Rome at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. In 304 BC, Rome concluded alliances with the Marrucini, the Marsi, the Paeligni and the Frentani<sup>50</sup> and the territories taken from the Aequi and the Volsci had been secured by settling the colonies from Alba Fucens and Sora, in 303 BC<sup>51</sup>. These actions show that Rome was firstly interested in strengthening its positions in the central area of Italy after more than 20 years of war.

Did Rome have an open conflict with Tarentum in 303 BC? The missing data in the sources do not allow an undoubtful answer. The paragraph of Diodorus might not refer precisely to the outbreak of the military operations, but more to the concern of the Dorian

<sup>44</sup> Diodorus 20.102.1; *Fasti consulares* 303 BC; Broughton 1951, 169.

<sup>45</sup> Livy 10.1.7; *Fasti consulares* 302 BC; Broughton 1951, 169.

<sup>46</sup> Livy ignores other episodes in Cleonymus western campaign, such as his arrival at Tarentum, the strained relations with Metapontum or his settlement at Corcyra. This situation shows that he or his sources concentrated only on the events that brought the Spartan general in contact with Rome. About the other events, noted by Diodorus, it is possible that the sources of Livy did not have any idea or they simply were of no interest.

<sup>47</sup> The intervention of Cleonymus in Italy: De Sanctis 1907, 344-345; Ciaceri 1932, 25-28; Hoffmann 1934, 51 *sqq.*; Piganiol 1967, 160; Giannelli 1974, 353-369; Lenschau 1985, 730-731; Purcell 1994, 392; Musti 2004, 557; Oakley 2005b, 49 *sqq.*

<sup>48</sup> Diodorus 20.104.1-2: *In Italy the people of Tarentum were waging war with the Lucanians and the Romans; and they sent envoys to Sparta asking for assistance and for Cleonymus as general.*

<sup>49</sup> Hofmann 1934, 51, n. 110.

<sup>50</sup> Livy 9.45.18; Diodorus 20.101.5.

<sup>51</sup> Livy 10.1.1-3; Salmon 1970, 59-60.

colony due to the isolation of the city after the Samnite League had left the war. In fact, the conflicting relation between Rome and Tarentum had been noted by Livy even since 326 BC. According to Livy, the alliance between Rome and Lucania led to the outbreak of the war between Tarentum and Rome<sup>52</sup>. During the Second Samnite War, there is no mention of Tarentum to have directly taken part in the conflict, but this absence could be explained by the possibility that the Roman-Lucanian alliance had blocked any initiative. Flanked by an ally of Rome, Tarentum hesitated to interfere with the operations in the center and South-East of Italy. The Lucanian League, allied with Rome since 326 BC, had been waiting for the defeat of the Samnites in order to reactivate its anti-Tarentine policy. The context allows us to understand the reason for the Lucanians mobilized their troops against the Dorian city in 304-303 BC: the league seems to have started the conflict with Tarentum immediately after the peace of Bovianum. The threatening shadow of Rome had been visible behind it since 326 BC, even if the Republic was not at an open war with Tarentum. Seen from this perspective, Diodorus suggests that the spirits were tense in 303 BC and dominated by the fear that Rome would send its troops to the South to help the Lucanian ally<sup>53</sup>. His account expresses the tensed relations between Rome and Tarentum, during the last two decades.

According to Diodorus, more than 30,000 fighters gathered under Cleonymus' command in 303 BC, an army that was strong enough to help Tarentum<sup>54</sup>. These expeditionary forces proved also extremely useful for putting the Spartan's plans into practice, as they are shown in the literary tradition. Diodorus mentions his intention to release Sicily from the domination of Agathocles, but he also records Cleonymus settled at Corcyra, closely watching the events in Greece and waiting for a favourable moment to interfere<sup>55</sup>. The Spartan never gave up his intention to play an important role on the stage of the Greek world, but, at the same time, the West tempted him because of its resources and political trouble from this area, that could be favourable for an opportunistic career<sup>56</sup>.

During the first year of his expedition, Cleonymus' main concern was to settle the relations with the Lucanian Federation. Diodorus does not record any battle between the forces under the Spartan's command and the Lucanian ones. He only mentions the fact that the Lucanians did not risk a military confrontation with a powerful army and preferred to sign a treaty<sup>57</sup>. Taking advantage of the Lucanians tendency towards plundering and violence, Cleonymus left Metapontum at the discretion of the Lucanian League because it refused to recognize his authority<sup>58</sup>. The generous offer of the Spartan commander and the fear of a military confrontation with a powerful troop convinced the Lucanians that the peace was better than the war at least for that moment.

<sup>52</sup> Livy 8.27.1-3.

<sup>53</sup> Beloch 1926, 434-435, Marasco 1984, 103, Oakley 2005b, 51 trusted the variant of the war between Rome and Tarentum, recorded by Diodorus; *cf.* also Afzelius 1943, 172-173.

<sup>54</sup> Diodorus 20.104.2; the Spartan hired 5,000 mercenaries from the camp of Tenares and added to them, on the expenses of Tarentum, an equally numerous troop recruited in Italy and 22,000 soldiers that probably represented the support of the cities in Magna Graecia.

<sup>55</sup> Diodorus 20.104.4.

<sup>56</sup> De Sanctis 1907, 345-346; Scullard 1951, 118; Lomas 1993, 41.

<sup>57</sup> Diodorus 20.104.3: *Then, since he had a strong army under his command, the Lucanians in alarm established friendship with the Tarentines (philia).*

<sup>58</sup> Diodorus 20.104.3-4.

Tarentines thought that this act would probably put an end to the Spartan's mission in Italy. Cleonymus and his army of mercenaries could not agree with this fast ending that, economically speaking, did not bring any advantages. Even since 303 BC, as Diodorus suggests, the Spartan commander began to create his own political identity in the South of Italy, entering into conflict with Tarentum and suppressing any form of opposition. Metapontum, which did not obey his authority, was left under the pressure of the Lucanian troops that attacked the city at his instigation. Through intimidation, he succeeded to enter the city where he took 600 hostages that should have guaranteed the inhabitants' obedience<sup>59</sup>.

His intention of building a personal dominion in the South of the peninsula led to the conflict with Tarentum, while his tyrannical behaviour drove his allies away in just a few months. Cleonymus heard about their rebellion in the winter of 303-302 BC, when his troops were concentrated in Corcyra, from where he was watching the evolution of the events in Greece<sup>60</sup>.

To avoid the definitive loss of his positions in Southern Italy, Cleonymus returned to the theatre of operations from the peninsula in 302 BC, but the details of his actions are briefly recorded. From this moment, we have also a record in *Ab urbe condita*, parallel with Diodorus' account of the events. Unfortunately, the two texts cannot be perfectly synchronized and the story is complicated by the Roman forces taking part in the events of the year 302 BC. Livy firstly records an attack of Cleonymus' troops against a place in the Sallentine area called Thuriae<sup>61</sup>, then he mentions the Roman reaction against his aggression<sup>62</sup>.

All the attempts to identify this mysterious Sallentine location did not lead to precise results<sup>63</sup>. The activity of the Spartan commander in the previous year mainly focused in Lucania and the South-East of Italy, where he could find allies among the Messapian communities<sup>64</sup>. His repression in 302 BC probably took also place in the Sallentine region and it was directed against the allies that had deserted. The violent actions of Cleonymus in 302 BC are also recorded by Diodorus of Sicily, who mentions the conquest of a city and the besiege of another place called Triopium<sup>65</sup>. According to the same author, the barbarians in the region put an end to the adventure of Cleonymus in the South of Italy. They managed to take him by surprise and defeated him in a night attack<sup>66</sup>. Although there are differences in details, the two versions, of Livy and Diodorus, agree on the essential: in 302 BC, Cleonymus fought against the populations in the Sallentine area, in the South of Tarentum.

<sup>59</sup> Diodorus 20.104.3-4; Strabo 6.3.4 noticed that Tarentum entered into conflict with the generals it had hired: Archidamus, Alexander the Molossian, Cleonymus, Agathocles and Pyrrhus.

<sup>60</sup> Diodorus 20.104.4; he turned down the alliances offered by Cassander and Demetrius (Diodorus 20.105.1).

<sup>61</sup> Livy 10.2.1-2: *Eodem anno classis Graecorum Cleonymo duce Lacedaemonio ad Italiae litora adpulsa Thurias urbem in Sallentinis cepit.*

<sup>62</sup> Livy 10.2.2-3.

<sup>63</sup> Philipp 1991, 1907, Lenschau 1985, 731: Thuriae in the records of Livy could be Uria, located by Strabo 6.3.7 on the road between Tarentum and Brundisium. The attempt to see Cleonymus' action as an attack against the Greek city of Thurii (Beloch 1926, 435, 462; Derow 1970, 47) can not be supported with solid arguments as it seems more of a conjecture suggested by the resemblance between the two names; see Oakley 2005b, 56-57.

<sup>64</sup> Diodorus 20.104.2.

<sup>65</sup> Diodorus 20.105.1-2.

<sup>66</sup> Diodorus 20.105.2-3.

About the Roman intervention, Livy found two versions in his sources. The first one shows the consul M. Aemilius Paulus successfully fighting against Cleonymus and pushing his forces back to the ships; following the victory, Thuriae was given back to its inhabitants. The second one mentions that the dictator C. Iunius Bubulcus had been sent to the Sallentine area but his legions did not enter the fight against the army of the Spartan commander<sup>67</sup>. The identity of the general who had the command of the Roman troops in the South is not essential for our discussion and we do not think that it would be possible to precisely choose between M. Aemilius Paulus and C. Iunius Bubulcus. Taking into account the narration of Diodorus on Cleonymus being driven away from the South of Italy, we can cautiously assume that the real scenario of the Roman intervention can be found, at least partially, in the second version recorded by Livy<sup>68</sup>. He noted that the dictator C. Iunius Bubulcus was sent among the Sallentini, but Cleonymus had withdrawn from Italy before being forced to fight against the Romans. This testimony seems to coincide in certain aspects with the version of Diodorus about the Spartan's defeat by the barbarians during a night attack. Corroborating the data recorded by two historians, we can assume that what made the Spartan commander to leave the Sallentine area was his defeat by the barbarians and not by the Roman troops.

The new Roman intervention in the South-East of Italy can not be considered as a fake account and its importance is proved in the light of the Roman-Tarentine relations in the last decade of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. Following the end of the Second Samnite War, Rome closely watched the evolution of events in the South of the peninsula. Cleonymus' arrival firstly affected the Lucanian League, one of the main political supporters of its policy in the South. In addition, no one could guarantee that the Spartan general would not do the same as Alexander the Molossian in an attempt to create a personal dominion in the peninsula. In this case, none of the allies of Rome in Apulia and in the Sallentine region was safe and the Roman network of treaties risked to be destroyed. During the first year of Cleonymus' presence in the South of Italy, Rome seemingly hoped that the Lucanian League would be able to face the threat coming from Tarentum by itself and the turn of events in 302 BC, with the open rebellion of the Sallentini against Spartan commander, was meant to remove, for a while, its worries. The violent repression of Cleonymus against the rebels and the attacks against the Sallentine communities created a new context that did not allow Rome to be passive. We can not find out if the allies got in 307 BC had been affected by his attacks, but the allied Sallentine communities had reasons to fear and ask for the protection against the Spartan commander. In these circumstances, it is possible that the Roman legions had moved towards the South in 302 BC in order to support the Sallentine allies that were in danger. This new interference in the Sallentine region had shown Tarentum the dangerous implications of the expedition in 307 BC. In conflict with Cleonymus and with the Roman troops in the proximity of the city,

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<sup>67</sup> Livy 10.2.2-3: *Adversus hunc hostem consul Aemilius missus proelio uno fugatum compulit in naves. Thuriae redditae veteri cultori, Sallentinoque agro pax parta. Iunium Bubulcum dictatorem missum in Sallentinos in quibusdam annalibus invenio et Cleonymum, priusquam confligendum esset cum Romanis, Italia excessisse.*

<sup>68</sup> Mommsen 1987, 220 accepted the struggle between the Romans and Cleonymus; Tillyard 1908, 209, Hoffmann 1934, 53, Oakley 2005b, 50 did not precisely choose either of the versions; De Sanctis 1907, 329, Ciaceri 1932, 28, Wuilleumier 1939, 96, Scullard 1951, 118, Giannelli 1974, 368, Derow 1970, 46 rejected the event.

the leaders of the Dorian colony felt forced to find a political solution to release the pressure from at least one of the adversaries.

At this stage, our analysis brings to light one of the controversial treaty in the Roman foreign affairs in the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. The Tarentine crisis in 282 BC started after a Roman squadron appeared in the Ionian Sea, because, according to Appian, an old treaty forbade the Romans to sail beyond the Lacinian Promontory<sup>69</sup>.

The Lacinian treaty could not be precisely dated, since Appian gave only a vague chronological reference expressed by the adjective *palaiós*. Some scholars dated it around 331 BC, during the presence of Alexander the Molossian in Italy, but this option is not completely sustainable<sup>70</sup>. The attempt to move the agreement at an earlier date, based only on the presence of the word *palaiós* in the text of Appian, does not lead to a plausible chronology. The careful analysis of the available literary sources about the expedition of Alexander the Molossian in the West questions the placing of the Lacinian treaty during this campaign. Two authors, Livy and Justin, recorded the contacts between Alexander and Rome and the conclusion of a treaty between them<sup>71</sup>. The relations of Rome with Alexander seem to have started when the king was brought by his military operations to Poseidonia, in 331 BC. By that year, he had already had tensed relations with Tarentum, which was worried regarding his attempt to build a personal dominion in the Southern Italy. Since Tarentum had already lost control over him in 331 BC., it would be more correct to interpret the treaty concluded with Rome only as a personal act guaranteed by the king, that could not involve the Tarentine foreign policy. This treaty, signed by a commander disregarded by the ones who asked for it, could not be brought into discussion in 282 BC in order to find a legal basis for the attack against the Roman fleet. The situation of the two contrahents makes us believe that in 331 BC they negotiated some kind of areas of influence: Rome was interested in getting the guarantee that Alexander would not interfere in the Northern Campania, while the king should be granted the neutrality of the Roman Republic in his future wars in Italy<sup>72</sup>.

In our opinion, the Lacinian treaty can be seen as a result of Cleonymus' presence in the Italic area<sup>73</sup>. This agreement was not signed by the Romans in 303 BC under the pressure of the arrival of the expeditionary troops from Greece. As shown above, the most plausible date for concluding the treaty is the year 302 BC, when Tarentum was caught between Cleonymus and Rome. The Dorian colony should have had the initiative of negotiations and it was certainly forced to make concessions. Appian recorded only the sailing clause from the treaty, because it proved essential for the outbreak of the Tarentine war in 282 BC. This stipulation could be the simplified form of a set of terms that blocked the access of Rome to the Greek cities in Magna Graecia. Tarentum, as the leader of the Italiote League, pretended to keep the hegemony over

<sup>69</sup> Appian, *Samnitiké* 7.1: *At Tarentum there was a demagogue named Philocharis, a man of obscene life, who was for that reason nicknamed Thais. He reminded the Tarentines of an old treaty by which the Romans had bound themselves not to sail beyond the promontory of Lacinium.*

<sup>70</sup> Cary 1920, 165-170; Mitchell 1971, 638; Oakley 1998, 681, n. 1; Forsythe 2005, 350-351.

<sup>71</sup> Livy 8.17.10; Justin 12.2.12.

<sup>72</sup> Adcock 1928, 594; Hoffmann 1934, 20-21; Lomas 1993, 42.

<sup>73</sup> Tillyard 1907, 206; De Sanctis 1907, 329; Beloch 1925, 202; Beloch 1926, 435; Ciaceri 1932, 26; Hoffmann 1934, 19, n. 30, 40, n. 97, 54; Wuilleumier 1939, 94-95; Afzelius 1943, 172-173; Thiel 1954, 20-21; Càssola 1968, 38; Schmitt 1969, 60-61; Heurgon 1973, 212; Giannelli 1974, 363; Marasco 1984, 98; Lomas 1993, 50; Musti 2004, 557; Bringmann 2009, 60.

them as it happened during the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC. An incident that took place in 282 BC is the proof of these stipulations of the Lacinian treaty: immediately after the attack against the Roman fleet, the Tarentine troops intervened at Thurii, where they managed to evacuate the Roman garrison<sup>74</sup>.

The terms that Appian did not mention can only be reconstructed hypothetically. Under the pressure of the Roman legions in the Sallentine region and affected by the conflict with Cleonymus, Tarentum, in exchange of the exclusiveness of action in Magna Graecia, had probably made some compromises in the South-East of Italy. Rome had major interests there and a network of allies gradually built since 326 BC. Taking into account the Southern Roman policy during the Second Samnite War, the negotiations in 302 BC obviously dealt with the South-Eastern corner of the peninsula, where the interests of the two powers dangerously met<sup>75</sup>. Tarentum was guaranteed that Rome would stop at the borders of Magna Graecia, both on sea and on land, but it was forced to recognize the alliances of Rome in Apulia and the Sallentine region, concluded during the last decades of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC<sup>76</sup>.

With these stipulations, the Lacinian treaty can not be seen as a failure of the Roman diplomacy. It is true that the agreement precluded the access of the Romans in Magna Graecia, but in this region they did not have major interests at the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC<sup>77</sup>. The conflictual relations with Tarentum made Rome to involve more and more in the political and military affairs of the Southern Italy, but in the last years of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC its Southern interests had certain limits. The treaty of Bovianum had put an end to the conflict in the Central Italy, but the Samnite League was not completely defeated and no one could estimate the period of peace between the two powers. In this climate, Rome did not have any reasons to risk a war in the South of Italy, especially after Tarentum had shown that it can introduce other dangerous factors from Greece into the Italic equation. The Romans obtained all they wanted in 302 BC, due to the unfavourable position of Tarentum, caught between Rome and Cleonymus. The Dorian colony recognized the external status of the communities allied with

<sup>74</sup> Appian, *Samnitiké* 7.1; cf. Hoffmann 1934, 54, Willeumier 1939, 95, Thiel 1954, 20-21.

<sup>75</sup> Hoffmann 1934, 54; Thiel 1954, 20-21; Musti 2004, 557: the Lacinium treaty tried to preserve the supremacy of Tarentum over the sailing in the Ionian Sea, in the north of the promontory of Lacinium.

<sup>76</sup> In 302 BC Rome had experience in negotiating its sphere of interests. This is proved by the first two treaties concluded between Rome and Carthage. The first one, dated by Polybius at the beginning of the Republic, blocked the access of the Roman ships beyond the Fair Promontory, but the Carthaginians obliged themselves not to act against Ardea, Antium, Laurentium, Circeii, Tarracina or against other Latin communities that were not subjected to Rome; in case they had conquered one of these cities, it should have been given back to the Romans; the Carthaginians were not allowed to build fortifications in Latium or to spend the night with war equipment in this region (Polybius 3.22.1-13). The second Roman-Carthaginian treaty, dated in 348 BC (Livy 7.27.2; Diodorus 16.69.1), forbade the Romans to plunder, trade or found a city beyond the Fair Promontory, Mastia and Tarseion; its stipulations stopped the access of the Roman traders in Libya and Sardinia, as well as the foundation of cities in these area, but the Carthaginians obliged themselves to give back to Rome any city conquered in Latium (Polybius 3.24.1-13). About these treaties, see Scardigli 1991, 24 *sqq.*

<sup>77</sup> The Roman fleet, although at its beginnings, worried Tarentum and this could explain the presence of the sailing stipulation in the treaty. The reorganization of the fleet in 311 BC, with the introduction of double naval magistracy (Livy 9.30.4), can not be interpreted as a direct measure to prepare the extension of the Roman policy towards Magna Graecia.

Rome and obliged itself not to attack them in the future. Examining in a general frame the political realities in Southern Italy and the stipulations of the Lacinian treaty, we can conclude that this agreement was to the advantage of Rome, recognizing the diplomatic and military successes it had acquired in Apulia and the Sallentine region since the beginning of the Second Samnite War.

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